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One consequence of Donald Trump’s November 2016 election as 
president, both his friends and foes might agree, is that his administration 
has gotten people thinking (and talking and writing) about the 
Constitution, including provisions that previously languished in obscurity. 
No example better illustrates this phenomenon than the Constitution’s 
previously all but forgotten prohibitions on presidential receipt of 
“Emolument[s]” from foreign powers,1 “the United States, or any of 
them.”2 
As we detail below, to date three lawsuits have claimed that President 
Trump is guilty of innumerable, continuing violations of these 
prohibitions. While the complaints in these cases devote many words to 
describing the alleged unconstitutional conduct, they are surprisingly 
laconic and vague on what relief would be appropriate were the plaintiffs 
to prevail. This brief essay evaluates a constructive trust as a remedy. 
We first treat, admittedly in a most cursory fashion, the merits issues 
(as opposed to procedural issues) raised in the pending suits. Then, we 
promptly pivot to a discussion of the doctrines governing imposition of a 
constructive trust, first in the context of private fiduciary relationships, 
and later as a response to government officials’ breaches of duties owed 
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7
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to the public. Drawing on the rationale underlying the application of the 
constructive trust in these contexts, we argue that a court, in the exercise 
of its equitable jurisdiction, would be justified in finding that the violation 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clauses by a sitting President creates a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the public treasury when the violation 
yields personal profit or gain to the President, even if such profit does not 
result in financial loss to the United States. 
I. THE MERITS, BRIEFLY 
Though Benjamin Franklin’s receipt of a jewel-encrusted snuff box 
from the King of France often gets the credit,3 the concept, and much of 
the language, of the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause4 pre-dates 
that much ballyhooed embarrassment. Article VI of the Articles of 
Confederation anticipated the Constitution in prohibiting “any person 
holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of 
them” from accepting “any present, emolument, office or title” from any 
foreign sovereign or state.5 Employing nearly identical language, the 
Constitution’s Article I, section 9 commands: 
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United 
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any pre-
sent, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince or foreign State.6 
The provision’s purpose is self-evident: U.S. officeholders ought not to 
be beholden to foreign powers.  And for two centuries, the clause was 
virtually self-enforcing. The encyclopedic The Constitution of the United 
3. Edmund Randolph, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, later invoked the example
of Franklin, without naming him, in recounting the Convention’s adoption of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 465–66 (2d ed. 1891) 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/elliot-the-debates-in-the-several-state-conventions-vol-3 
[https://perma.cc/83Q3-X6HN].  
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution forbids the appointment 
of any Senator or Representative to any civil office “the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
increased” during the term for which he or she was elected. Moreover, after securing to the President 
a salary “which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have 
been elected,” Article II of the Constitution prohibits “within that Period any other Emolument from 
the United States, or any of them.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Though some of the suits against 
the President assert violations of both the Article II provision and the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
we focus solely on the latter, both in the interest of brevity and because the claimed violations of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause present most starkly the question of presidential loyalty explored herein. 
5. Articles of Confederation, art. VI, § 1.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
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States: Analysis and Interpretation indicates that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause is one of the very few provisions of the Constitution for which 
there are no Supreme Court rulings to report.7 
That may soon change. In 2017, no fewer than three separate lawsuits 
were filed in federal courts alleging that President Trump’s on-going 
business arrangements violate both the Foreign and the Domestic 
Emoluments clauses. The first, filed on January 23 in the Southern District 
of New York by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
(CREW),8 alleges (among other things) that President Trump’s on-going 
involvement with, and enrichment from, his numerous U.S. and foreign 
rental and hospitality properties’ dealings with the foreign governments, 
their representatives, and the entities they own and control, all violate the 
prohibition of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.9 In addition to seeking a 
judicial declaration to this effect, the only other remedy sought is an 
injunction ordering the President to cease “violating the Foreign . . . 
Emoluments Clause, as construed by [the district court],” and “to release 
financial records sufficient to confirm” his compliance with the court’s 
order.10 
In June, the Department of Justice moved to dismiss the suit, arguing 
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claimand, in the alternative, that they 
lacked Article III standing, that they failed to state an injury within the 
Emoluments Clause’s zone of interests, and that, in any event, the Clause 
was not implicated by “benefits arising from a President’s private business 
pursuits having nothing to do with his office or personal service to a 
7. The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 112-9, at
402-03 (2017 ed.) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2017/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017-9-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBX5-SD3V] (citing no cases). To be sure, innumerable Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinions address issues arising under the Clause, but this is in part 
what is meant by self-enforcing. 
8. Complaint, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017).  The complaint has been twice amended and refiled. See Second Amended 
Complaint, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 
2017). https://www.sdnyblog.com/files/2017/06/17-Civ.-00458-2017.05.10-Second-Amended-
Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FSQ-F27C]. 
9. Second Amended Complaint at para. 7. The complaint also attacks the President’s 
continued receipt of “payments from foreign-government-owned broadcasters related to rebroadcasts 
and foreign versions of the television program ‘The Apprentice’ and its spinoffs.” Id.  The other two 
suits are Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed June 14, 2017) 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Blumenthal_v_Trump_DDC_Original_C
omplaint_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFP-3HBW]; and District of Columbia & State of Maryland 
v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D.Md. filed June 12, 2017) 
https://ia800101.us.archive.org/13/items/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534.1.0.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6H9C-3SCH].  Although the various lawsuits also claim violations of the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause, we limit our discussion here to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  
10. Id. at para. 257 (b). 
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foreign power.”11 After briefing and argument on that motion, the district 
court delivered the President an early Christmas present on December 21 
by dismissing the suit. The court ruled that none of the plaintiffs had 
Article III standing and that, in any event, their complaint sought 
resolution of a non-justiciable political question.12 The court’s present, 
however welcome, was also significantly incomplete; the court expressly 
declined to address “whether [the] Plaintiffs’ allegations state a cause of 
action under either the Domestic or Foreign Emoluments Clauses” as well 
as “whether the payments at issue would constitute an emolument 
prohibited by either Clause.”13 
In keeping with this symposium’s focus on remedial questions, we 
do not express an opinion on either the justiciability or merits issues in 
any of the pending cases.  Rather, for the sake of argument we assume that 
the clause has been violated and consider only the propriety of a 
constructive trust as a remedy. 
II. THE PRIVATE LAW OF TRUSTS
Within the private law of trusts, a trustee is a person who holds legal 
title to property for the benefit of another. However much of a rogue a 
person may be in his personal affairs, once he puts on the hat of a trustee, 
his conduct becomes subject to the highest of fiduciary standards in all 
matters relating to the trust. If he be rogue in that capacity—even a little 
or even unwittingly—any breach of the fiduciary standards to which he is 
subject that results in his own personal profit may be remedied by judicial 
imposition of a constructive trust.14 A child of equity, the constructive 
trust prevents a person from profiting from his wrongful conduct.15 With 
11. Def.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, at 26 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) http://guptawessler.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/2017-06-09-35-MTD-Mem.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAY8-FXDW]. 
12. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, 2017 WL 6524851, 
at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017). 
13. Id. An appeal is pending as of this writing. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v.
Trump, No. 17 Civ. 458, Notice of Appeal, Doc. 105 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018). 
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 (1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a . . . profit, he holds what he receives upon a 
constructive trust for the beneficiary.”). 
15. The constructive trust is based upon “the equitable principle that no one should be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or take advantage and profit as a result of his own wrong or 
crime.” In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt. 1966) (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 
(N.Y. 1889)).   
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deterrence and prevention of faithless conduct as its goal,16 this remedy 
requires the rogue trustee to convey any ill-gotten gains to another, 
because allowing the trustee to retain them would unjustly enrich him.17 
To remain on the straight and narrow pathway of fiduciary 
righteousness, a trustee must adhere to the following core fiduciary 
standards: (1) the duty to administer trustee responsibilities in accordance 
with the governing document; (2) the duty of prudence; (3) the duty of 
loyalty; (4) the duty of impartiality; and (5) the duty to account and 
inform.18 Our discussion herein primarily concerns the duty of loyalty and 
its application to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Accordingly, we omit 
coverage of the remaining fiduciary tenets. 
The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act solely in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.19 Consequently, the duty of loyalty includes 
a strict prohibition against self-dealing—conduct which entails “the risk 
that the fiduciary may be enriched at the expense of the beneficiary.”20 
An errant trustee whose conduct falls short of this fiduciary mandate 
is liable to the trust’s beneficiary,21 who can bring an action against the 
trustee to hold him to account for the breach. As atonement for any 
wrongful conduct from which the trustee profits or gains financially in his 
personal capacity, a court may require the trustee to convey property to 
the beneficiary. In other words, a court may find that the trustee holds the 
ill-gotten gains on constructive trust in favor of the beneficiary.22 This is 
16. Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 596 (1955) (observing that the goal of equitable remedies 
in cases of public trust violations are “always on the fundamental basis of preventing the unfaithful 
public official or public body profiting from his or its wrongdoing.”). 
17. A Concise Restatement of Donative Transfers and Trusts 458 (Thomas P. Gallanis ed.
2017). See also Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160 (1937); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 1 
cmt. e (1959); V.A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462, at 3413 (3d ed. 1967)). 
18. Note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive of the duties of trusteeship. For a fulsome 
categorization, see GALLANIS, supra note 17, at 761-813.  
19. Id. at 769. “The duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the 
standards of other fiduciary relationships.” Id., at 770. This fiduciary obligation is one of undivided 
loyalty to the beneficiaries and requires the trustee to “subordinate his own interests to the welfare of 
the beneficiaries” in all matters pertaining to the trust. Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the 
Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (2004) (citing Bogert & Bogert § 543, at 217; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §170 (1959)). 
20. Natelson, at 1089; GALLANIS, at 769 (noting that, with certain exceptions, “the trustee is
strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or 
create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests.”). 
21. A trust may have more than one beneficiary. For simplicity, we use the singular form
throughout this paper. 
22. “Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and the acquisition or 
retention of the property is in violation of his duty as a fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive trust 
for the other.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION § 190 (1937). “Where a fiduciary in violation 
of his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what 
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so even when the beneficiary suffers no harm from the trustee’s faithless 
conduct.23 
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE PUBIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Drawing on the private law of trusts, courts have long held public 
officials to the same fiduciary standards imposed upon private trustees. 
Together, these standards form the core of the public trust doctrine.24 And, 
as in the private law of trusts, it is the breach of a fiduciary duty which 
serves as the cornerstone for the imposition of a constructive trust when 
the breach allows the public official to obtain personal profit or gain.25 “If 
the public can recover from the [corrupt public official] everything he 
gained from his misconduct, whether or not the public itself suffered 
direct loss, then it has a powerful weapon for protecting itself from its 
faithless servants.”26 In this regard, the constructive trust serves as the 
appropriate vehicle both to vindicate the public interest in holding the 
corrupt public official to account and to deter other fiduciary offenses.27 
For example, in Jersey City v. Hague, when three city officials 
banded together to force city employees to pay over to the officials three 
percent of the employees’ salaries in an extortion scheme extending over 
a thirty-two year period, the city sued. In determining whether the trial 
court had properly granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. The court found the city to be 
the real party in interest,28 and the city officials to have held “positions of 
public trust,”29 to have allegedly looted the public till,30 and to have 
violated the fiduciary duties they owed to the public (if the allegations 
he receives upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION § 
197 (1937). The constructive trust is not a trust in the true sense of the word, but merely a legal term 
for the equitable remedy described in this section. 
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ON RESTITUTION § 197, cmt. c (1937) (“The rule stated in [§ 197]
is applicable although the profit received by the fiduciary is not at the expense of the beneficiary.”). 
24. The basic idea of the public trust doctrine is that “public officials are legally bound to
[adhere to] (appropriately adapted) standards borrowed from the law regulating private fiduciaries.” 
Natelson, at 1088.  
25. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 197 (1937) (“Where a fiduciary in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a . . . profit, he holds what he receives upon a 
constructive trust for the beneficiary.”). 
26. Arthur Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public Office, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 214, 215 (1954); see also Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 589-91. Here, the term 
“corrupt” is not limited solely to a quid pro quo form of bribery, but rather includes other types of 
violations of the public trust.   
27. Hague, 18 N.J. at 596.
28. Id. at 596. 
29. Id. at 589. 
30. Id.at 588-89. 
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were proven true).31 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff’s 
requested remedy—a constructive trust in favor of the city—was an 
appropriate prayer for relief.32 The court’s decision relied heavily upon 
the public trust doctrine.33 Other examples abound, and courts have 
imposed constructive trusts for public-official wrongdoing in myriad 
contexts.34 
To the extent that the constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for 
a public official’s violation of his fiduciary duties, so too would it be an 
appropriate remedy for a federal officeholder’s violation of a 
constitutional duty that results in that officeholder’s profit or gain. This is 
so, at least in part, because in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, the 
Founders applied the tenets of the public trust doctrine, and therefore built 
into the constitutional structure the same fiduciary duties as those from 
the private law of trusts.35 
IV. THE FIDUCIARY LAW OF THE FOUNDERS
The rogue public official was a well-known character to the 
Founders, and they feared, mightily, that a faithless public servant would 
be swayed by both foreign and domestic influences to act against the 
national interest in exchange for personal gain. This clear-eyed vision of 
human nature and the corrupting effects of power gave the Framers a 
particularly robust sense of the need to address these risks as they 
31. Id. at 589-96. 
32. Id. at 596. 
33. Id. at 589-91 (“[Public officials] stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they 
have been elected or appointed to serve. As fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal they are under 
an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity. In discharging the duties of 
their office they are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, to be diligent 
and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to display 
good faith, honesty and integrity. They must be impervious to corrupting influences and they must 
transact their business frankly and openly in the light of public scrutiny so that the public may know 
and be able to judge them and their work fairly. . . . These obligations are not mere theoretical 
concepts or idealistic abstractions of no practical force or effect; they are obligations imposed by the 
common law on public officers and assumed by them as a matter of law upon their entering public 
office.”) (citations omitted). Other cases bear out the notion that the constructive trust is an appropriate 
remedy for corruption by public officials, regardless of whether the public till suffers any actual loss. 
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) (finding that the imposition of a constructive 
trust was the appropriate remedy, even though the Army had not been financially aggrieved and 
stating: “The larger interests of public justice will not tolerate, under any circumstances, that a public 
official shall retain any profit or advantage which he may realize through the acquirement of an 
interest in conflict with his fidelity as an agent.” Id. at 306.). 
34. See, e.g., Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1913); City of Boston 
v. Santosuosso, 10 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1937); Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc.,
402 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1980). 
35. Natelson, supra note 19 at 1091. 
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undertook the sober and awesome obligation of creating a new form of 
government. Their solemn task in this regard benefitted from their 
knowledge of, and reverence for, fiduciary tenets. Indeed, at the time of 
America’s founding, those who framed and ratified our Constitution 
operated within a political and legal context built upon a “fiduciary ideal 
of government service”36—i.e., the concept of a public trust doctrine 
applicable to public officials—which formed a core principle of founding-
era standards of governance.37 
According to Professor Robert G. Natelson’s extensive study of 
founding-era documents, the Founders’ understanding and application of 
public trust tenets encompassed the five core fiduciary principles from 
private trust law.38 The Founders were steeped in fiduciary law 
principles;39 they discussed these principles during the drafting and 
ratifying debates;40 and they incorporated mechanisms within the 
constitutional structure to ensure that fiduciary standards would be met.41 
The Founders created a structure of government that reflects the 
public trust doctrine’s fiduciary norms, in part to ensure that public 
36. Id. at 1083. 
37. Id. at 1095-1135 (examining founding-era documents and concluding that the “public trust 
doctrine seems to have been an ideal that almost everyone agreed on”, Id. at 1137). 
38. Id. at 1088-1168 (noting that, although the terminology and foci of emphasis varied, the
core duties permeated both the sources upon which the Founders relied and the language the Founders 
themselves used to draft and discuss good principles of governance). 
39. See Natelson, at 1077 (noting that the Founders’ political and legal canon was replete with 
discussions of public trust and the attendant fiduciary obligations imposed upon public officials); 
Complaint, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D.Md. 
filed June 12, 2017) (observing that the Articles of Confederation used the language of trusts in the 
predecessor to the Foreign Emoluments Clause in referring to office holders to whom the provision 
applied, Id., at 8 (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, §1) and that many state 
constitutions contained similar provisions which incorporated the language of trusts, Id. at 31-32 
(citing MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 33 and 53; PA. CONST., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE 
INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OR STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. V; S.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
art. X; and MASS. CONST. ch. II, art. XIII.)). 
40. E.g., James Madison Journal (July 20, 1787), in Max Farrand, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-2 
[https://perma.cc/P6BP-F6XG]. (observing that a “chief Magistrate,” left unchecked, would risk 
“betray[ing] his trust to foreign powers.”); Letter from Roger Sherman (Dec. 8, 1787), in 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 286 
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987) http://www.consource.org/document/roger-sherman-to-___-1787-12-8/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZC2-RR4Y] (“In every government there is a trust, which may be abusedFalse”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that persons elected to office “may 
find compensations for betraying their trust. . .”); see also Natelson, at 1077, n. 271 (noting the 
frequent use by The Federalist of the terms “public trust,” “guardian,” “guardianship,” “public 
servant” (or words of similar import), “trustee”, and “agent”). 
41. See Natelson, at 1137-1168 (describing how various provisions of the Constitution
implement core fiduciary standards from the law of trusts). 
2018] THE BRAND V. THE MAN 119 
officials, including (even especially) the Chief Executive, would be bound 
by them.42 For our purposes, we limit discussion strictly to the duty of 
loyalty, which is the duty most heavily implicated by the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. As for that duty, the exclusive, undivided loyalty of 
a federal office-holder is in the best interest of the nation.43 The Framers 
incorporated a number of mechanisms to ensure the President’s undivided 
loyalty to the American public in the execution of the nation’s laws and 
the administration of the nation’s business.44 To ensure adherence to the 
duty of loyalty, the Framers made it more difficult for the President to 
succumb to the temptations of foreign corrupt influences by including the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause.45 
The duty of loyalty was so central to the Framers’ understanding of 
the fiduciary nature of public office that they relied upon it as rationale 
for including a provision allowing for the impeachment and removal from 
office of a faithless Chief Executive.46 Remedies beyond the Constitution 
also exist. Anti-corruption statutes passed by Congress, for example, 
criminalize certain conduct that also entails breaches of the public trust.47 
42. Id. at 1168 (“[O]ne of the Founders’ ‘general purposes’ was to construct a government that 
would, to the extent practicable, operate according to certain fiduciary norms.”). 
43. Complaint at 16, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458 
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 14, 2017) http://guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/08/MembersofCongress.pdf.  
44. Among them are the checks and balances of power invested in the separate branches of
government, designed to make each branch independent from the potential for undue influence of the 
others (Natelson, at 1147-48); the prohibition against federal legislators serving in or accepting newly-
created or newly-enhanced executive offices so as to “‘guard[] against the danger of executive 
influence upon the legislative body,’” (Id., at 1148 and n. 315 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 and 
quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001) http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf); the provision barring changes to 
executive compensation during his or her term of office, Id., at 1148 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 
II, §. 1, cl. 7); and the Domestic Emoluments Clause, which was intended to minimize the likelihood 
of domestic corruption (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7). 
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Other examples of loyalty-infused provisions include a
requirement that only natural-born citizens are eligible to be President (Natelson, at 1148 (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. II, §. 1, cl. 5)), and a requirement that, prior to assuming office, the President-elect swear 
or affirm loyalty to the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7). 
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. During the Constitutional Convention debates, for example, James 
Madison expressed his concerns about the risk of disloyalty in his support for an impeachment 
provision: 
[I]t [is] indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community [against] the 
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service, 
[sic] was not a sufficient securityFalse He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation 
or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. 
James Madison Journal, supra note 40 at 65-66 (emphasis added). 
47. See, e.g., Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1948); Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1939).  
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But even when duty-of-loyalty violations do not rise to the level of 
criminality,48 or create the political will to impeach, another potentially 
powerful remedy remains for rectifying a rogue President’s wrongdoing. 
That remedy is the constructive trust.49 
V. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE 
In light of the Founders’ reliance on fiduciary principles from trusts 
law in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, courts’ use of constructive 
trusts as a remedy for breach of those duties by a public official, and the 
general acceptance of the public trust doctrine in Anglo-American law, 
we now consider how the public trust doctrine operates as justification for 
the imposition of a constructive trust when a sitting President violates the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause.50 In this regard, we apply the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to conduct that would align with that standard, and we draw a 
contrast to conduct that would fall short of that standard. 
When making decisions in an official capacity, a President must do 
so with a singular goal in mind: the best interests of the nation. When a 
President’s undisclosed, private business affairs are entangled with 
foreign nations, the public may reasonably be concerned that policy 
choices are based upon on what is best for the President’s private interests, 
or indebtedness to a foreign government, or what is in that foreign 
government’s best interests.51 
48. See Jersey City. v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 591 (1955) (observing that civil law may provide a 
remedy for public corruption even when criminal does not). See also, Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 
219 to Retired Foreign Service Officers, 11 Op. O.L.C. 67, 68 n. 2 (1987) (concluding that not all 
conduct that violates the Emoluments Clause falls within the criminal proscription of § 219). 
49. Lenhoff, supra note 26 at 215. Indeed, the constructive trust may prove to be an even more
effective remedy than either impeachment or prosecution because it is “[a] sanction which divests a 
dishonest official of his ill-gotten rewards” and consequently “cuts the heart out of his enterprise.” Id. 
50. Although the same principles apply to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, we limit our
discussion to the Foreign Emoluments Clause in light of space considerations. 
51. Complaint at 41, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458 
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 14, 2017) http://guptawessler.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/MembersofCongress.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDU9-G653] (citing 
Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovernment Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 114, 
122 (1993) (commenting on the enduring wisdom of the Clause’s central insight: that our leaders 
“might be biased, and [their] loyalty divided, if they received financial benefits from a foreign 
government.”)). Similarly, the Domestic Emoluments Clause was adopted to ensure that the 
President’s loyalty remained devoted to the best interests of the union and that his judgment in that 
regard would not be tainted by “pecuniary inducement[s]” that would turn the presidency into “a 
position of both power and profit.” Complaint at 43, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. 
Trump (quoting Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 137 (D.D.C. 1975), rev’d by Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press v. Sampson, 591 F.2d 944 (D.D.C 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The Foreign Emoluments Clause exists precisely to address such 
concerns. By requiring a President to secure congressional consent before 
accepting an emolument from a foreign government, the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause operates on an underlying premise that Congress 
itself will operate in good faith and undertake the necessary 
investigations—openly and transparently—to determine whether it 
should grant or withhold consent. A President who meets the strict duty 
of loyalty called for under fiduciary principles would ensure that he 
conducts public business transparently, and without conflicts of interest, 
that he obtain the consent of Congress before accepting a foreign 
emolument, and that he cooperate with Congress in its efforts to determine 
whether to allow a given emolument. In practice, this means that a 
President should release his tax returns, divest himself of potentially 
problematic holdings, make use of blind trusts, follow the advice of ethics 
experts,52 submit formal requests to Congress (and wait for approval) 
before accepting any emolument from a foreign government, and dispose 
of any emolument already in his possession in the manner prescribed by 
Congress.53 
Indeed, in efforts to comply with the emoluments clauses, past 
presidents have released their tax returns, divested themselves of 
potentially problematic holdings, made use of blind trusts, obtained and 
relied upon advice from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), sought 
congressional consent to accept foreign emoluments, and followed 
congressional direction in disposing of any foreign emolument already in 
the President’s possession.54 
If, instead of following these past practices, a President were to defy 
all of them (as Trump is alleged to have done),55 then the public would 
52. In this regard, the non-partisan Office of Government Ethics has, for decades, offered legal 
advice to help Presidents avoid conflicts of interest, including any that may arise as a result of business 
entanglements (whether foreign or domestic) or other transactions that may implicate the Emoluments 
Clauses so that the President can, if necessary, obtain congressional approval, decline an emolument, 
or divest himself from problematic business holdings. 
53. Complaint at 32-33, Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed June
14, 2017) https://www.theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/
Blumenthal_v_Trump_DDC_Original_Complaint_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFP-3HBW]. 
54. Id. (noting that in cases where Presidents have declined acceptance of gifts from foreign
states, Congress has instructed that the gifts be sold and the proceeds deposited in the Department of 
the Treasury, or that the gifts themselves be conveyed to an appropriate governmental repository). 
55. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, 12, 14, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump;
Complaint at 42, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM 
(D.Md. filed June 12, 2017) https://ia800101.us.archive.org/13/items/gov.uscourts.mdd.391534/
gov.uscourts.mdd.391534.1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H9C-3SCH]; Complaint at 19, Blumenthal, et 
al. v. Trump. 
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have good reason to ask in whose interests he acted when he exercised the 
vast authority of his office.56 In such a case, the public would be more 
than justified in concluding that at best the President’s loyalty is divided, 
and that at worst he is, at the expense of the public weal, either profiting 
personally or advancing the interests of a foreign government, or both. 
A President’s acceptance of foreign emoluments without obtaining 
the consent of Congress raises troubling questions about his willingness 
to be bound by constitutional requirements and his commitment to the rule 
of law. It also fails to comply with the fiduciary duty of strict loyalty to 
act solely in the nation’s best interests. Accordingly, if demonstrated to 
have violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause, a President should be held 
to account. The violation may not constitute a crime, and it may not give 
rise to the political will necessary to impeach, but such a fiduciary breach 
should not go unaddressed. For retrospective violations that involve self-
dealing, the imposition of a constructive trust would be a justifiable 
remedy for the failure to meet the public official’s fiduciary duty of 
loyalty owed to the public he ostensibly serves.57 
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that fiduciary duties from the law of trusts animated the 
structure and provisions of the Constitution, given that those same duties 
find expression in the public trust doctrine, and given that the imposition 
of a constructive trust is the remedy for violating fiduciary duties in both 
the law of trusts and in cases involving public officials who have violated 
their fiduciary duties, it becomes eminent that an appropriate remedy in a 
successful Emoluments Clause case against a President, were any plaintiff 
to survive pre-trial challenges and prevail upon the merits, would be the 
imposition of a constructive trust. As an equitable remedy, the 
constructive trust falls within the ambit of the inherent judicial authority. 
It matters not that a President’s receipt of foreign emoluments steers clear 
of raiding the public till. Courts may nevertheless reach the profits of gains 
obtained by self-dealing in violation of the core fiduciary standards 
attached to public office. Accordingly, a court finding violation of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause could order disgorgement of the profits a 
President has realized while in office, and, to the extent they are no longer 
56. Complaint at 10-11, District of Columbia & State of Maryland v. Trump. 
57. We note that a constructive trust offers greater deterrent force than an injunction against
future violations, and that an additional remedy worth considering as a mechanism for preventing 
prospective violations by a wayward President is a judicially imposed and administered blind trust. 
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in his possession, the gains can be traced to third parties and restitution 
ordered if not in the hands of bona fide purchasers. 
As for the specific cases brought against Donald Trump, courts may 
perhaps be reluctant to order even such a well-worn remedy in such 
politically charged circumstances. Furthermore, the extent of foreign and 
domestic holdings and the opacity of Trump’s business structure would 
make identifying and tracing emoluments an exceedingly complex 
undertaking, and one that would be an enormous drain on judicial 
resources. A court could—and likely would—appoint a special master to 
oversee and administer such matters as courts do have a long and 
successful record of disentangling complex business structures and 
complex financial transactions. Still, courts are not infrequently hesitant 
to be the first to extend existing remedies to new contexts, even when well 
within their power to do so. 
Regardless, possible judicial reticence should not be taken to mean 
that no alternate means are available for the imposition of a constructive 
trust. Congress may also have power to enact legislation to provide for 
remedies of a President’s violations of the Emoluments Clauses (foreign 
and domestic). Whether and to what extent Congress has such power, 
including what form such a statute might take, are questions that are ripe 
for investigation but beyond the scope of this paper. Further beyond the 
scope of this paper is whether, if Congress has such power, legislating 
what is a traditionally equitable remedy would be desirable. Certainly, it 
would seem that, in light of statutes such as the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act,58 Congress does possess such power—at least for 
prospective violations—and even though the Foreign Gifts Act does not 
establish a constructive trust as a remedy, Congress likely could codify it 
as such, or could embolden the courts by expressly authorizing the judicial 
branch to consider constructive trusts as the remedy for Emoluments 
Clause violations. 
58. The Foreign Gifts Act, which operates as an exception to the otherwise “absolute ban” of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause, covers federal employees and permits them to accept basic lodging, 
travel originating and ending outside the United States, meals, and gifts of “minimal value.” Jeffrey 
Green, Application of the Emoluments Clause to Department of Defense Civilian Employees and 
Military Personnel, 2013 Army Law. 15, 16 (2013). Accord 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2012). 
